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Federal Compensation for Victims of the
"Homeownership for the Poor" Program
It is probably inevitable that, in any government program, not all
of the participants will be benefited to as great a degree as the pro-
gram's proponents would have hoped. But the federal "homeowner-
ship for the poor" program' is unusual; thousands2 of participants
actually were left in a far worse condition3 than before they took part
in the program.
To date, all suits for damages that participants have brought against
the federal government have been unsuccessful, 4 and remedial legis-
lation5 enacted by Congress has been woefully inadequate.6 This
1. National Housing Act §§ 235, 221(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z, 17151(d)(2) (1970).
2. See Stegman, Low-Income Ownership: Exploitation and Opportunity, 50 J. URBAN
L. 371, 375-77 (1973); Comment, Property Abandonment in Detroit, 20 WAYNE L. REV.
845, 858-64 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Property Abandonment]; Note, Exploiting the
Home-Buying Poor: A Case Study of Abuse of the National Housing Act, 17 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 525 & n.3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor]; Note,
Abuses in the Low Income Homeownership Programs-The Need for a Consumer Protec-
tion Response by the FHA, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 461, 471 & n.52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Abuses].
3. See sources cited in note 2 supra. See also SPECIAL PENNSYLVANIA STATE TASK FORCE,
FINAL REPORT ON REAL ESTATE SALES PRACTICES IN EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA (1972) [herein-
after cited as PA. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT] (on file with the Yale Law Journal). This is
not to say that no one was helped or that the homeownership for the poor idea should be
dropped permanently as hopeless. See Singer, Landon & Graham, Section 235 Housing:
One Empirical Study with Recommendations for the Future, 7 IND. L. REV. 773, 813 (1974)
(concludes that "[t]he section 235 program should not be abandoned since its benefits ap-
pear to be great and its problems controllable") [hereinafter cited as Empirical Study].
4. Plaintiffs' damage claims have been dismissed in: Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp.
29 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd as to dismissal of damage claim and vacated and remanded as to
injunctive relief, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974); Perry v. Romney, Civil No. 9347 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 5, 1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 472 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1973); Jackson v. Romney,
355 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No. 73-1510 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 11, 1974); Cason v. United States, Civil No. 19025-2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 5, 1973)
(partial summary judgment denying damage claim), (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1974) (dismissing
other claims), appeal docketed, No. 74-1672, 8th Cir., Aug. 23, 1974; Massey v. Lynn,
Civil No. 39822 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2122, 6th Cir. Oct. 14,
1974; Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973); Pollard v. Rom-
ney, Civil No. 73-91 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1974). There are no reported cases, and apparently
no unreported ones either, where such plaintiffs have won damages against the govern-
ment.
It is true, however, that plaintiffs in two cases-Davis v. Romney, supra, and Bailey v.
Romney, 359 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1973), government's appeal dismissed per stipulation,
No. 73-2036 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 1974), plaintiffs' appeal docketed, No. 73-2007, D.C. Cir.,
July 25, 1973-have won injunctions against the government. As to the inadequacies of
injunctions in these situations, see p. 302 infra.
5. National Housing Act § 518, 12 U.S.C. § 1735b (1970), as amended, Housing &
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 306, 88 Stat. 678.
6. See pp. 303-06 infra.
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Note concludes that many of these low-income homeownership vic-
tims should be held entitled to damages against the United States
even under the present limited waiver of sovereign immunity rep-
resented by the Federal Tort Claims Act,7 but also that Congress
should enact legislation to provide expeditious and full recompense
to all such people and should consider broader legislation to ensure
that future hapless victims of government programs will not go
remediless.
I. Background
In 1968,8 Congress launched a major effort 9 to promote homeown-
ership for low-income families by enacting § 23510 of the National
Housing Act." The program authorized the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration (FHA) of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) to insure mortgages on homes sold to low-income
buyers12 through a special risk insurance fund.' 3 The mortgage could
be for as much as 97 percent of the value of the property,14 and
the buyer's down payment could be as little as $200, a sum which
could be used to pay closing costs.'0 In addition, § 235 authorized
the Secretary of HUD to make payments directly to the mortgagee
on behalf of the low-income buyer-mortgagor, 16 so that the buyer-
mortgagor's effective mortgage interest rate could be reduced to as
little as one percent,' 7 depending on the size and income of the
buyer-mortgagor's family.' 8 Statutory changes in 1968 also enabled
more low-income people to purchase homes under §§ 221(d)(2)19 and
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674-80 (1970).
8. Act of Aug. 1, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 101(a), 82 Stat. 476.
9. Le Clercq, Entitlement Under Section 235 of the National Housing Act, 25 S.C.L.
REV. 1, 3 (1973); Schafer & Field, Section 235 of the National Housing Act; Homeowner-
ship for Low Income Families?, 46 J. URBAN L. 667, 667-70 (1969).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1970).
11. Id. §§ 1701 et seq.
12. As defined by id. § 1715z(h)(2). See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 18, 26-28. See
generally Schafer & Field, supra note 9.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-3 (1970).
14. Id. § 1709(b)(2).
15. Id. § 1715z(i)(3)(C). The minimal $200 down payment in lieu of the full three
percent down payment will no longer be allowed. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 211(a)(6), 88 Stat.
671.
16. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z(a) (1970).
17. Id. § 1715z(c).
18. See generally C. EDSON & B. LANE. A PRACrIGAL GUIDE TO LOW- AND MODERATE-IN-
COME HOUSING 5:1-5:14 (1972); Schafer & Field, supra note 9.
19. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(2) (1970). See Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor, supra note 2,
at 527-28; Hearings on Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages (Detroit) Before the Sub-
comm. on Legal & Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1971); Property Abandonment, supra note 2, at 859-60.
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20320 of the National Housing Act-sections originally enacted prior
to 196821-even though they still do not provide for financial as-
sistance from FHA.
22
Some hailed the 1968 legislation as "perhaps the most significant
piece of housing legislation ever enacted in this country," 23 designed
to enable thousands, even millions, of the poor2 4 to realize the
American dream of owning a single-family, detached home.2r Home-
ownership, many felt, would "give lower income groups a 'stake in so-
ciety' and would increase both their sense of responsibility and of
community"--significant benefits to all of American society in the
wake of the then-recent urban riots.2 7
But the low-income homeownership program encountered severe
problems almost immediately, because the low-income participants
lacked homebuying sophistication 2 8 because FHA was not prepared
to administer such a large scale and radically new program,20 and
because the mortgage insurance was structured in a way that actually
made it in the interest of lenders to loan money on uninhabitable
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (1970). See Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor, supra note 2, at
527-28; Hearings on Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages (Detroit) Before the Subcomm.
on Legal & Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-4 (1971); Property Abandonment, supra note 2, at 859-60.
21. Section 221(d)(2) was originally enacted as Act of Aug. 2, 1954, ch. 649, § 123, 68
Stat. 599. Section 203 was originally enacted as Act of June 27, 1934, ch. 847, § 203, 48
Stat. 1248.
22. See sources cited in notes 19-20 supra.
23. Freilich & Seidel, Recent Trends in Housing Law: Prologue to the 70's, 2 URBAN
LAW. 1, 4 (1970) (referring to §§ 235, 236).
24. Id. Freilich and Seidel felt, however, that the programs would not reach the
"hard core" poor, id., and they were joined in this feeling by Berger, Homeownership
for Lower Income Families: The 1968 Housing Act's "Cruel Hoax", 2 CONN. L. REV. 30
(1969).
25. See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 5.
26. See Property Abandonment, supra note 2, at 860.
27. Id. at 859-60.
28. In one study, "virtually none of the section 235 purchasers . . . had lived in his
own home prior to his section 235 purchase." Empirical Study, supra note 3, at 787. See
also HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, DEFAULTS ON FHA-INsuRED HOME MORT-
CAGEs-DEmRoIT, MICH., H.R. REP. No. 1152, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Holifield Report]; PA. TASK FORCE FINAL RErORT, supra note 3, at 6; Special
Project, The 235 Housing Program in Action: An Empirical Examination of its Adminis-
tration and Effect on the Homeowner-Participant in the Columbia, South Carolina Area,
25 S.C.L. REV. 93, 130-31 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Special Project); Exploiting the
Home-Buying Poor, supra note 2, at 525.
29. This was due both to shortage of staff, Holifield Report, supra note 28, at 22-25,
and to what HUD Secretary George Romney termed the difficulty of attempting
to change the organizational thinking of an organization [FHA] that has been re-
viewing things purely from a credit standpoint to a consumer oriented organization
which is required to administer this program successfully ....
Hearings on HUD Investigation of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Programs Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1971) (titled as "In-
terim Report on HUD Investigation of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Programs')
[hereinafter cited as HUD Investigation Hearings].
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homes.30 These features attracted a host of unscrupulous realtor-
sellers3 ' and finance company mortgagees.3 2 Often in combination
with corrupt HUD employees and contractors,33 they foisted on thou-
sands34 of unwary participants "homes in dire need of complete re-
habilitation .... [homes] which should have been razed .... [homes
having] no resale value . . ,.
The House Committee on Government Operations described as
typical 30 the case of Maurdell Harris, who bought a home in Detroit
under § 221(d)(2) and discovered, shortly after moving into the house
with her husband and nine children, that the furnace did not work,
that the electricity had to be turned off "for the sake of safety" due
to a short circuit, and that the gas service had to be discontinued
because of a gas leak.37 Since Mrs. Harris paid $12,650 to a real
estate speculator who had bought the house six months earlier for
$6,000,38 the Committee concluded that "what the real estate specula-
tor had turned over to Mrs. Harris, at a 100 percent profit to himself,
was little more than a wooden shell unfit for human habitation."3 9
Mrs. Harris and her family apparently did not suffer any physi-
30. Hood & Kushner, Real Estate Finance: The Discount Point System and Its Effect
on Federally Insured Home Loans, 40 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 1, 18 (1971). See also Exploiting
the Home-Buying Poor, supra note 2, at 546-48. Basically, lenders could charge sellers a
discount (which the sellers could pass on to buyers through higher home selling price),
and yet the lenders could collect full face value immediately upon default. Thus, assum-
ing prompt reinvestment, the faster the default the greater the lender's rate of return.
Thus, notwithstanding the high-sounding and purposeful language of HUD's own
guidelines stressing policies supposedly designed to preserve home ownership, in
reality, HUD has thrust these low-income mortgagors into the marketplace subject
only to the benevolence of "prudent" mortgagees and the state courts. Such an
abdication of its responsibility is clearly inadequate....
HUD has lost sight of who the Congress intended should be the beneficiaries of these
low income programs. These programs were not created for the benefit of the
mortgagees, although we have been constantly struck by HUD's insistence upon
supporting and condoning the mortgagees' challenged practices.
Brown v. Lynn, Civil No. 73 C 334, at 27, 29 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 1974) (HUD's alleged
policy on §§ 235 & 203 foreclosures actionable under APA).
31. This is implicit in the guilty verdicts and in the heavy sentences imposed by the
court in United States v. Bernstein (E.D.N.Y. July 4, 1974 [trial ended], Oct. 4, 1974
[sentences imposed]), in N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1974, at 35, col. 6. According to the Ass't
U.S. Att'y, many § 221(d)(2) houses were involved. Telephone Interview with Ass't U.S.
Att'y Accetta, E.D.N.Y., Oct. 11, 1974. (Notes from all telephone interviews cited in this
Note are on file with the Yale Law Journal.) See also Property Abandonment, supra note
2, at 861-62; Defaults Hit HUD Subsidies, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1974, at Al, col. 1.
32. See sources cited in note 31 supra.
33. Id.
34. See sources cited in note 2 supra.
35. STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91sr Co Nc., 2D SFss., REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ABusEs IN FEDERAL Low- AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSING PRO-
cRAMs 4 (Comm. Print 1970) (reprinted in HUD Investigation Hearings, note 29 supra)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. See note 61 infra.
36. Holifield Report, supra note 28, at 16.
37. Id. at 16-17.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 17.
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cal injuries as a result of living in their house, but other purchasers
and their families were not so fortunate. One home buyer's mother
allegedly died from double pneumonia resulting from the § 221(d)(2)
house's lack of heat.40 Another buyer's six-month-old granddaughter
died of exposure allegedly due to the repeated breakdowns of a fur-
nace during the winter shortly after the family moved into their
"rehabilitated" § 235 house.41 Still another buyer allegedly suffered
blood poisoning and a serious blood clot in her leg, necessitating
three weeks' hospitalization, from falling through-a hole in the floor
of the house's den just a few days after moving in. The hole ap-
parently had merely been covered up in a cosmetic fashion; it had
not been structurally repaired.42
In 1970, the staff of the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency had ominously warned that the low-income homeownership
program was already "on its way toward insuring itself into a na-
tional scandal." 43 In 1972, the House Committee on Government Op-
erations complained that
HUD, through its poor management of the mortgage insurance
programs, has been unable or unwilling to control the despoil-
ment of these housing programs by speculators and money lenders
and to assure that the beneficiaries of such programs receive the
protection and benefits mandated by law.44
The Committee admonished:
The time has long passed when the Federal Government, in this
case HUD, can sit by relying on and trusting in fair dealings in
the marketplace.
45
Despite salvage attempts made from 1970 through 1973,40 the low-
income homeownership program, in the words of a special Pennsyl-
vania task force, resulted in
the families' suffering, anguish and humiliation from having
their houses collapse on them, the pain and permanent damage
to the health of their children because of the lack of heat or
40. Complaint at 35, Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1973). afJ'd sub nom.
Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No. 73-1510 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974).
41. Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor, supra note 2, at 525.
42. Complaint at 16, Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973).
43. STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 1.
44. Holifield Report, supra note 28, at 17.
45. Id.
46. See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 36-42. See generally HUD Circulars HPMC-FHA
4441.30 (Apr. 9, 1971); 4441.30A (Apr. 27, 1972); 4441.30B (Aug. 29, 1972).
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poisoning by lead-based paint, the foreclosure and subsequent
eviction from their homes for failure to pay for a house that is
falling apart, their financial credit permanently destroyed so that
they may never be able to purchase another home, and their faith
in every branch of government forever shattered because of its
inaction and insensitivity. 47
In early 1973, the Nixon Administration unilaterally suspended
§ 235,48 thus provoking an intense court fight.4 9 Yet despite the
relatively brief period in which § 235 was in operation, mortgages on
more than 300,000 new housing units and more than 75,000 existing
housing units were insured under the program.50 Moreover, in the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,rl Congress re-
jected the Nixon Administration's attempts to kill § 235 permanent-
ly . 2 Although no new funds were appropriated for § 235 for Fiscal
1975,r3 the Act encouraged, but did not compel, the use of existing
contract authority during Fiscal 1975,54 and it extended § 235's life
through Fiscal 1976, subject to further funding.55
II. Recovering Damages from Private Parties
It would appear logical for these victims to seek compensation from
the sellers, realtors, contractors (if the housing involved was newly
constructed or rehabilitated), or mortgagees with whom they dealt.
However, there are substantial obstacles to recovery against any of
these private parties. Many of the sellers are poor themselves, they
47. PA. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
48. 31 CONG. Q.W. REP. 40 (1973).
.19. Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'g 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C.
1973) (Sec'y of HUD has the "limited discretion" to suspend the operation of housing
subsidy programs "when he has adequate reason to believe that they are not serving
Congress' purpose of aiding specific groups in specific ways, or are frustrating the national
housing policies applicable to all housing programs").
50. Housing Production and Mortgage Credit-FHA: Home Mortgages Insured by
FHA 1935-1972, 1972 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 167-68 (1974) (Table 159). These figures
do not include a total of more than 58,000 additional housing units insured by HUD
under § 235 in 1973. 3 Biggest Cities Would Gain Under New Housing Bill, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1974, at 20, col. 4, col. 8.
51. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 211, 88 Stat. 671.
52. Section 235 would have been completely replaced under the Nixon Administration's
proposals: S.2507, S.2508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See also Major Housing Bill to Aid
Poor Approved by Senate Committee, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1974, at 36, col. 1.
53. See 32 CONG. QAV. REP. 2264 (1974).
54. Actually, in the one year following the date of enactment of the Act. Pub. L. No.
93-383, § 211(a)(2), 88 Stat. 671. See also CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1279, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 120 CONG. REc. H8058, H8098 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1974);
32 CONG. QAV. REP. 2398 (1974).
55. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 211(a)(l), 88 Stat. 671. See also CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R.
REP. No. 1279, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. H8058, H8098
(daily ed. Aug. 12, 1974); 32 CONG. Q.W. REP'. 2319 (1974).
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are the previous occupants of these substandard dwellings,56 and could
not pay a large judgment. Moreover, it may be hard to prove fraud
since many of these sellers would not have known what was going
on and may merely have been manipulated by unscrupulous realtors.
57
A large number of the other sellers are realtors who bought the
properties in order to convey them at huge profits to low-income
purchasers under § 235.r, While fraud may be present as to these
sellers or realtors, in many cases they have effectively made themselves
judgment proof by organizing shell corporations with no assets or by
conducting business as fly-by-night operators. 9 Moreover, even where
there are accessible assets, it can be very difficult to prove scienter
required for fraud, 60 and it may take years for such cases to be resolved
-much too long under these circumstances.01 And the Legal Services
and Legal Aid lawyers, who typically are the only attorneys available
to these low-income buyers, 62 may simply lack the time and personnel
to handle all of these difficult cases effectively on an individual basis.60
56. Telephone Interview with C. Edward Dilkes, Esq., formerly Legal Aid attorney for
Nash (of Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973)), Mar. 5, 1974
[hereinafter cited as Dilkes Interview]. (Obviously, this observation and that in the text
infra, apply only to already "existing"-rather than newly-constructed-homes. As to con-
tractors of newly-constructed homes, see p. 301 & note 65 infra.)
57. Id.
58. Id. See also Stegman, supra note 2, at 376-77; Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor,
supra note 2, at 533-34; STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 8.
59. Dilkes Interview, supra note 56; Telephone Interview with Stephen M. Randels,
Esq., Legal Services attorney for Perry (of Perry v. Romney, Civil No. 9347 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 5, 1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 472 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1973)), May 2, 1973.
60. Telephone Interview with James A. Kushner, Esq., formerly Legal Aid attorncy
for the Casons (of Cason v. United States, Civil Action No. 19025-2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 5,
1973) (partial summary judgment denying damage claim), (V.D. Mo. July 8, 1974) (dis-
missing other claims), appeal docketed, No. 74-1672, 8th Cir. Aug. 23, 1974), May 3, 1973
[hereinafter cited as Kushner Interview]. Note that, in addition, "[t]he broker would be
able to offer the FHA appraiser's report as a defense." Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor,
supra note 2, at 567.
It should be noted that fraud cases of this sort against the realtor are occasionally won
by plaintiffs: Adams v. Montgomery Real Estate & Co., Civil No. 71-187086-R CH (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 1973). But even where fraud might possibly be proved, there may be other
factors, discussed in the text, preventing the successful prosecution and recovery in a
fraud suit. See Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor, supra note 2, at 567.
61. Kushner Interview, supra note 60. At least, several years may be too long to wait
if the family wants or needs to stay in the house-see pp. 297-98 supra-and/or if the
family seeks to avoid foreclosure. For a description of the types of defects in these homes,
see STAFF REPORr, supra note 35, at 3 passim. For photographs of some of these defects,
see id. at 113-28. See generally PA. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
62. One Legal Services office approached eight private law firms in hopes of getting
them to handle such cases on a referral basis. It was remarkably unsuccessful, because
the firms considered these sorts of cases to demand excessive amounts of legal research,
investigation, documentation, discovery, pre-trial preparation, and trial time. Plaintiffs'
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 8 n.7, Massey
v. Lynn, Civil No. 39822 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2122, 6th
Cir., Oct. 14, 1974.
63. Telephone Interview with George D. Gould, Esq., Legal Services attorney for Davis
(of Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd in part and vacated and re-
manded in part, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974)) May 1, 1973. See also note 62 supra.
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In addition, the neighborhoods involved tend to have high resident
turnover, making it hard to locate witnesses, and white neighbors
may be disinclined to testify on behalf of poor blacks who have just
moved into their neighborhoods. 4 Similar problems exist as to the
contractors. 5
Mortgagees are less likely to make undercapitalized or judgment
proof defendants. 6 Many of them have insured a large number of
properties 7-and profited handsomely upon foreclosure.68 However,
the difficulty in proving scienter and the problem of limited legal
services remain. 9 Other possible obstacles lie in lack of privity under
local contract law70 and lack of sufficient duty under local tort law.
71
Therefore, some suits against private defendants may result in
effective relief. But the many problems described, as well as the com-
mon element linking the cases-the role of the FHA-make the United
States government an attractive (even if not the only possible) de-
fendant. Recent low-income homeownership plaintiffs have pursued
a variety of claims in their quest for effective compensation.
III. Relief under the Administrative Procedure Act
Purchasers might seek a form of relief by invoking judicial review
of FHA's activities under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
72
64. Kushner Interview, supra note 60.
65. Telephone Interview with Stanton J. Price, Esq., formerly attorney for Nash (of
Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973)), Mar. 5, 1974. See Com-
ment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New Housing, 35
U. Cm. L. REV. 739, 740 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Lender Liability].
66. The FHA has standards for approving mortgagees, including capital requirements:
24 C.F.R. § 203.1-203.9 (1974).
67. Holifield Report, supra note 28, at 18-19.
68. See note 30 supra.
69. See pp. 300-01 supra.
70. That is, lack of privity between the mortgagee and the seller in the buy-sell con-
tract between the seller and the plaintiff-buyer. See Jeminson v. Montgomery Real Estate
& Co., 47 Mich. App. 731, 210 N.W.2d 10, leave to appeal granted, 390 Mich. 788 (1973).
71. See id. But see Conner v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 477 P.2d
609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (which may have been partially overruled by CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 3434 (West 1970)); Morrocco v. Felton, 112 N.J. Super. 226, 270 A.2d 739 (1970). For a
discussion of possible causes of action by buyers of new homes against institutional con-
struction lenders, see Lender Liability, supra note 65, at 755-60.
72. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). The APA provides, id. § 702, that "[a] person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." It also,
id. § 706, gives to the reviewing court the power to "(I) compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law ... (D) without observance of procedure required
by law...."
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It appears that purchasers have standing to bring such suits, 73 and
it may be that significant equitable relief is available under the APA, 74
although this is far from certain.75 But even if the APA can give
rise to equitable relief, the APA apparently does not by itself give
courts the power to award damages"6 against the government, 77 and
injunctive or mandamus relief cannot provide compensation for pain
and suffering, physical injuries,7 8 or ruined credit ratings,79 which
73. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Low-
income homeownership plaintiffs were held to have APA standing in Davis v. Romney,
355 F. Supp. 29, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd on this issue, 490 F.2d 1360, 1363-64 (3d Cir.
1974); cf. Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737, 741 (1973) (no standing under APA), aff'd
on other grounds sub nom. Jackson v. Lynn, No. 73-1510 at 3, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974).
74. Plaintiffs in Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1370 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'g in
part and vacating and remanding in part 355 F. Supp. 29, 33, 45 (E.D. Pa. 1973), ap-
parently have won the right to some sort of injunction, and they are seeking very broad
relief on the remand, including (1) having HUD make or reimburse homeowners for
whatever repairs are necessary to bring every subcode .§ 235 or 221(d)(2) existing-house-
progr.am property bought in Philadelphia since January 1, 1968, up to code standards; (2)
requiring HUD to make "every attempt possible"-including "periodic notices over sus-
tained periods of time in the newspapers, radio and television"-to locate the people who
bought and vacated such sub-code properties, in order (3) to offer to them-at no more
than what they paid on their original property, with no down payment, and with full
credit for amounts paid on the mortgages of their original properties-houses that HUD
has acquired through foreclosure or otherwise; (4) having HUD provide adequate moving
expenses to these people plus having HUD take "all necessary steps to insure that these
people shall not have their credit impaired in any way"; and (5) having the court ap-
point a master to oversee, review, and implement this order. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of
Law in Support of Proposed Order for Relief at 3-5, Davis v. Romney, [on remand, as]
Civil No. 71-198 (1974).
75. The court in Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No. 73-1510 at 7-8 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974)
dismissed an APA claim for injunctive relief because of the plaintiffs' failure to allege
or demonstrate that the desired action was previously requested of, and denied by, HUD.
While the court said that the corrective administrative action sought, which could result
in the plaintiffs' acquisition of homes other than their present defective ones, "[a]rguably
... might be considered ... , viewed as judicial review under section 10(a) of the [APA], of
.agency action' violative of section 221(d)(2) that has injured the plaintiffs," id. at 7, the
short shrift given to the plaintiffs' other claims, for Tucker Act and declaratory relief,
may suggest that the court would not have been any more favorably disposed to the APA
claim even if the plaintiffs had shown a prior request and denial. Viewed in this light,
the comment of the Davis court that it was remanding "so that, if possible, an injunction
may issue more narrowly drawn to meet the needs of this case," Davis v. Romney, 490
F.2d 1360, 1370 (1974) (emphasis added), may indicate that the Davis plaintiffs' hopes on
remand, supra note 74, are unlikely to be realized. This is certainly the view of Cason v.
United States, Civil No. 19025-2, at 9-10 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1974).
76. "[A]t common law there could be no damages in a mandamus proceeding." An-
not., 73 A.L.R.2d 903, § 1 (1960). "[I]n many jurisdictions in the United States, statutes
permit the award or recovery of damages in a mandamus proceeding." Id. § 2[a]. The
APA says nothing about damages being permitted under it.
77. Although 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970) might be viewed as giving the courts the power
to compel action which would involve the expenditure of some funds by the United
States-see Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1369-70 (3d Cir. 1974)-the Supreme Court has
said that the APA is not "to be deemed an implied waiver of all governmental immunity
from suit," Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 516 (1952) (dictum). Even those circuits
which have said that the APA is a complete waiver of sovereign immunity (see Littell v.
Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1212-14 (4th Cir. 1971)) have not actually had any cases where
they wound up ordering the government to pay compensatory damages.
78. See pp. 298, 299 supra, as to pain and suffering and physical injuries.
79. As to effect on credit ratings and future ability to buy decent homes, see Abuses,
supra note 2, at 471.
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are real injuries that the low-income homeownership victims have
suffered.
IV. Relief under § 518 of the National Housing Act
Perhaps because of the inadequacies of suits against private par-
ties and of actions under the APA, Congress in late 197080 enacted
§ 518(b)s' of the National Housing Act, authorizing the Secretary of
HUD "to make expenditures to correct, or to compensate the owner
for, structural or other defects which seriously affect the use and
livability of any single-family dwelling which is covered by a mort-
gage insured under [§ 235 only] .... " Under § 518(c),8 2 the Secretary
was directed to promulgate regulations to "prescribe the terms and
conditions under which expenditures and payments may be made
under the provisions of [§ 518(b)] . . . ." Three months passed 3
before regulations were issued, and the regulations that finally ap-
peared adopted as a test for determining whether § 518(b) assistance
would be granted to particular applicants
[t]he extent to which the defects represent a clear and present
danger to the health and safety of the occupants .... 84
It is unclear why HUD chose to employ such a narrow requirement,
and it was promptly and successfully challenged in court.85 HUD
80. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, § 104, 84 Stat. 1771.
81. 12 US C. § 1735b(b) (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 306, 88 Stat. 678.
The pre-1974 version is used here, for discussion purposes. Changes are discussed in
pp. 305, 306 infra. Note that this section covers "existing homes"-which is where the
most serious problems had been discovered. See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 32 & 44. Section
518(a)-12 U.S.C. § 1735b(a) (1970)-covers new housing, and had been enacted as Act
of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, § 121, 78 Stat. 783 (and amended slightly in 1967).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 1735b(c) (1970). This section was enacted along with § 518(a). See note
81 supra. It has not been altered by Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633.
83. Until April 9, 1971, when HUD Circular HPMC-FHA 4441.30 (Apr. 9, 1971) was
promulgated.
84. The regulations adopted as additional tests "(b) [t]he availability of funds from
which the Secretary is authorized to make expenditures hereunder; and (c) [s]uch other
matters as he deems material." 24 C.F.R. § 200.527 (1974).
85. Bailey v. Romney, 359 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D.D.C. 1973), government's appeal dis-
missed per stipulation, No. 73-2036 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 1974), plaintiffs' appeal docketed,
No. 73-2007, D.C. Cir., July 25, 1973. The court rejected not only HUD's § 518(b) test,
but alo the plaintiffs' suggested § 518(b) test-i.e., that reimbursement should be due
for all defects which are in violation of the local codes: The court held that the test re-
quired by the statute was whether the defects "seriously affect the use and livability of
the home"-quoting the statutory language. 359 F. Supp. at 601-02. But see note-96 infra
(1974 change in this statutory language).
The court preliminarily enjoined the Secretary of HUD from applying the "clear and
present danger" standard, directed application of the "serious effect on the use or
livability" standard, and remanded the plaintiffs' applications for reimbursement under
§ 518(b) to the Secretary for evaluation in light of this standard. 359 F. Supp. at 601-02.
Now almost two years later, most of the Bailey plaintiffs are still awaiting relief. Accord-
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then issued a second s6 and finally a third87 set of rules for administer-
ing § 518(b). However, HUD has been severely criticized for failing
to follow even these, its own regulations, 88 and § 518(b) itself has
been attacked as not providing sufficient protection 9 or relief00 for
the § 235 victims. Moreover, § 518(b) was not available to § 221(d)(2)
and § 203 participants even though they may have suffered the same
ing to Roger Wolf, Legal Services attorney for Bailey, Bailey was a "paper victory" which
to date "hasn't helped the clients much." Telephone Interview, October 11, 1974. The
Bailey court refused to certify the action as a class action, and held that HUD was not
required to provide an adjudicatory hearing for determination of eligibility for § 518(b)
reimbursement. 359 F. Supp. at 602-03.
86. HUD Circular HPMC-FHA 4441.30A (Apr. 27, 1972). This circular was issued while
Bailey v. Romney, 359 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1973), was still pending-and presumably at
least in part because of the pendency of the case.
87. HUD Circular HPMC-FHA 4441.30B (Aug. 29, 1972). Interestingly, the original
"clear and present danger" test was retained in 24 C.F.R. § 200.527 (1974). Thus, if Bailey
v. Romney, 359 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1973), was correct about those original regulations
being out of harmony with the statute under which they were issued, then presumably
those regulations became "a mere nullity." Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner,
297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). Note that the governing statute has now been changed to re-
quire a test similar to the one rejected as not permissible under the prior statute. Pub.
L. No. 93-383, § 306, 88 Stat. 678.
88. Indeed, HUD has been sued for failing to comply with those regulations that
HUD has itself chosen to issue. See LaCount v. Romney, Civil No. 72-2082 (E.D. Pa.,
filed Oct. 25, 1971). It is alleged there, for example, that although HUD-after over a
year of delay-notified named plaintiff Woolfolk that it had determined that it would
repair under § 518(b) some 36 items that it had determined under the regulations to be
serious enough, "[d]espite numerous phone calls and letters as to the condition of her
property almost no work took place on her property for the next ten months." Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Apr. 30, 1973).
According to the attorney for Nash (of Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 15, 1973)), HUD has "made absolutely no effort to make § 518(b) work." Dilkes
Interview, supra note 56. Other attorneys from around the country have expressed similar
sentiments: Telephone Interview with G. Dan Bowling, Esq., attorney for Jackson (of
Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub non. Jackson v. Lynn, Civil
No. 73-1510 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974)), Aug. 20, 1973; Telephone Interview with Roger
Wolf, Esq., Legal Services attorney for Bailey (of Bailey v. Romney, 359 F. Supp. 596
(D.D.C. 1973), government's appeal dismissed per stipulation, Civil No. 73-2036 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 11, 1974), plaintiffs' appeal docketed, Civil No. 73-2007, D.C. Cir. July 25, 1973), Sept.
4, 1973; Telephone Interview with Jerome Riffel, Esq., Legal Aid attorney for the Casons
(of Cason v. United States, Civil No. 19025-2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 5, 1973) (partial summary
judgment denying damage claim), (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1974) (dismissing other claims), ap-
peal docketed, Civil No. 74-1672, 8th Cir., Aug. 23, 1974), March 1, 1974. It is true that
HUD has done some adequate and prompt repairs under § 518(b)-particularly after
having been sued or threatened with suit: Telephone Interview with Attorney Randels,
supra note 59, Mar. 1, 1974.
89. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 62, at 9-10, Massey v. Lynn, Civil No. 39822 (E.D.
Mich. June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 74-2122, 6th Cir., Oct. 14, 1974; Complaint
at 13, Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973). Among the
procedural complaints about § 518(b) are that it leaves the determination of defects up
to the very agency that failed to spot them initially; that it does not require an ad-
judicatory hearing; that it leaves compensation-even where HUD finds that there are
§ 518(b)-eligible defects-discretionary rather than making it mandatory; and that §
518(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1735b(c) (1970), forbids judicial review of HUD's determinations under
§ 518(b).
90. One such complaint is that § 235 requires that there be no code violations when
the mortgage insurance is approved, and yet § 518(b) allows compensation only for de-
fects that "seriously affect the use and livability" of the house. The court in Bailey v.
Romney, 359 F. Supp. 596, 602 (D.D.C. 1973), found these to be different standards. See
also Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 62, at 10, Massey v. Lynn, Civil No. 39822 (E.D. Mich.
June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 74-2122, 6th Cir., Oct. 14, 1974.
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types of harm that prompted Congress to enact § 518(b) for § 235
victims."' Indeed, several congressmen considered the deficiencies
of § 518(b) and HUD's performance under § 518(b) to be so glaring
that bills to amend § 518(b) were introduced little more than a year
after its enactment,92 and they were followed by others.93
Section 518(b) finally was amended, by the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974, 94 but the standard for relief is
even more restrictive than before. Although it properly extends
§ 518(b)'s coverage to certain § 203 and § 221 homeowners, 9 the
amended section adopts a modified form"0 of the "clear and present
danger" test that was unsuccessfully embodied in HUD's first regula-
tions under the original § 518(b). 7 It thus leaves § 235 homeowners
worse off than before.
The major deficiencies that have not been ameliorated by the 1974
amendments comprise a long list. Even the new § 518(b) fails to re-
quire-not just authorize-HUD to make reimbursements where the
statutory conditions for them are met, nor does it require that the
payments be made promptly or within a specified time limit.98 It
leaves standing the § 518(c) bar to judicial review of the determina-
tions" which are, after all, being made by the very agency accused
of being at fault in allowing such substandard houses to be approved
for insurance in the first place. It does not require HUD to take
all steps necessary to notify owners of the availability of such relief,100
nor does it shift the burden of proving discoverability of the defects
as of the date of the issuance of the insurance commitment from
91. See H.R. REP. No. 417, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973). Note the change discussed in
text infra (1974 change).
92. S.3248, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 704 (1972); S.3892, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R.
14754, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 16704, 92d Cong.. 2d Sess. § 7(c) (1972).
93. S.3066, 93d Cong.; 2d Sess. § 107 (1974); S.855, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.J.
Res. 512, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(a) (1973).
94. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 306, 88 Stat. 678.
95. Id. As amended, § 518(b) covers not only § 235 existing-home homeowners, but
also those §§ 203 and 221 homeowners whose existing homes are "located in an older,
declining urban area." Presumably, this neighborhood requirement relates to § 223(e) of
the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715n(e) (1970).
96. "The Secretary is authorized to make expenditures to correct, or to reimburse the
owner for the corrections of, structural or other major defects which so seriously affect
use and livability as to create a serious danger to the life or safety of inhabitants of [the
covered dwellings] . (Emphasis added.)
97. See p. 303 supra.
98. Both would have been required under the original version of S.3066, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 107 (1974). For the scope of the problem, see note 88 supra.
99. Review would have been permitted in the original version of S.3066, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., § 107 (1974).
100. This is a serious problem. Empirical Study, note 3 supra, at 800 n.70. Such noti-
fication would have been required under the original version of S.3066, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 107 (1974).
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the homeowner to HUD.' 0' It fails to require an adjudicatory hear-
ing,10 2 and 'it does not provide compensation for all deviations
from code compliance. 03 Moreover, whereas the original language of
§ 518(b) 10 4 could at least arguably be taken to permit compensation
for consequential-but very real-harms resulting from structural de-
fects of the house, 0 5 the new language makes clear that such com-
pensation is unavailable. 10 6
V. Suing the United States for Damages under the Tucker Act
Due to the shortcomings of private, administrative, and legislative
remedies, several suitS'o7 have been brought against the federal gov-
ernment for damages under the Tucker Act. 08 That statute gives
jurisdiction to the federal Court of Claims'0 9 and concurrently, for
claims not exceeding $10,000, to the U.S. district courts"0 over "any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitu-
tion or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive de-
partment, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States . . .-..
101. This might have been accomplished under the original version of S.3066, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 107 (1974).
102. This is particularly important since the very agency that allowed such homes to
be FHA-insured is the agency determining whether or not the purported defects are ones
that-to quote § 518(b)-"a proper inspection could reasonably be expected to disclose"
(as of the date of issuance of the insurance commitment).
103. See pp. 308-09 infra.
104. The statute authorized
expenditures to correct, or to compensate the owner for, structural or other defects
which seriously affect the use and livability .... (Emphasis added.)
105. For examples, see pp. 298, 299 supra.
106. It authorizes compensation only
to correct, or to reimburle the owner for the correction of, structural or other major
defects which so seriously affect use and livability as to create a serious danger to the
life or safety of inhabitants . . . . (Emphasis added.)
107. Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd in part and vacated and
remanded in part, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974); Perry v. Romney, Civil No. 9347 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 5, 1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 472 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1973); Cason v.
United States, Civil No. 19025-2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 5, 1973) (partial summary judgment
denying damage claim), (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1974) (dismissing other claims), appeal docket-
ed, Civil No. 74-1672, 8th Cir., Aug. 23, 1974; Massey v. Lynn, Civil No. 39822 (E.D. Mich.
June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 74-2122, 6th Cir., Oct. 14, 1974; Nash v. Romney,
Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973); Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737
(D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No. 73-1510 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974);
Williams v. United States, Civil No. KC-3346 (D. Kan., filed June 8, 1971); Brown v.
United States, Civil No. 18943-2 (XV.D. Mo., filed Dec. 23, 1970), dismissed without
prejudice (Apr. 1, 1971).
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1970).
109. Id. § 1491.
110. Id. § 1346(a)(2).
111. Id. § 1491.
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A. Constitutional Claims
At least one of the recent cases 1 2 alleges that the operation of
§ 235 has deprived plaintiffs of property without just compensation,
creating a claim founded on the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion." 3 The weakness of this approach is that the Fifth Amendment
by its terms applies only to "private property taken for public use,"" 4
and it is difficult to fit the present problem into that framework.
There is no property of the plaintiffs that the United States or the
general public has come to possess or use.115 And while it might be
argued that the U.S. has "taken" the plaintiffs' former good credit
rating or previous decent housing, these are at best consequential
rather than direct effects of the governmental action. It has long
been held that where the injury is not direct but is merely consequen-




Several suits" 7 have been brought on the theory that the victims
have a Tucker Act claim founded upon an Act of Congress. They
point out that although §§ 235 and 221(d)(2) do not give directly to
low-income home buyers any right to damages or indeed by terms
any other rights," 8 they do provide that
112. Brown v. United States, Civil No. 18943-2 (W.D. Mo., filed Dec. 23, 1970), dis-
missed without prejudice (Apr. 1, 1971).
113. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Such an inverse eminent domain claim seems to be the
only type of "claim founded upon the Constitution" that can be brought under the
Tucker Act. See Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United States and its
Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 876-81 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
114. (Emphasis added.)
115. See p. 314 infra, as to the mortgage insurance premium.
116. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923); Keokuk &
Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 125 (1922); Bedford v. United States, 192
U.S. 217 (1904).
117. Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd in part and vacated and
remanded in part, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974); Perry v. Romney, Civil No. 9347 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 5, 1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 472 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1973); Massey v.
Lynn, Civil No. 39822 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 74-2122, 6th
Cir. Oct. 14, 1974; Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973);
Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Jackson v. Lynn, Civil
No. 73-1510 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974); Williams v. United States, Civil No. KC-3346 (D.
Kan., filed June 8, 1971); Brown v. United States, Civil No. 18943-2 (W.D. Mo., filed
Dec. 23, 1970), dismissed without prejudice (Apr. 1, 1971).
118. For example, the crucial § 221(d)(2)-which establishes the code-compliance re-
quirement (quoted in text infra)-is worded in terms of eligibility of mortgages for
insurance and is located "as part of a section regulating loan ratios and maximum
property value insurable, and permitting other financial restrictions to be imposed as
prerequisites to mortgage insurance." Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1372 (3d Cir. 1974).
Section 221(d)(2) does not talk in terms of low-income home buyers' rights.
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[t]o be eligible for insurance under [these] section[s], a mort-
gage shall be secured by property upon which there is located a
dwelling conforming to applicable standards prescribed by the
Secretary under [§ 221(f)], and meeting the requirements of all
State laws, or local ordinances and regulations, relating to the
public health or safety, zoning, or otherwise, which may be ap-
plicable thereto .... 119
Plaintiffs argue 20 that this gives to home buyers under §§ 235 or
221(d)(2) the right to houses complying with all local codes, and that
their demands for damages to compensate for denials of this right
thus are claims founded upon an Act of Congress.
The government has repeatedly' 2 ' argued that this language does
not mandate that the FHA withhold mortgage insurance on homes
that do not comply with local codes, noting122 that § 221(f)'
23 pro-
vides that "[t]he property . . . shall comply with such standards and
conditions as the Secretary [of HUD] may prescribe to establish the
acceptability of such property for mortgage insurance . . . ." The gov-
ernment also makes a policy argument 124 that it would be administra-
tively burdensome for HUD to learn and seek compliance with all
of the local housing and building codes around the nation. Such a
burden, it is argued, could retard HUD's achievement of Congress'
stated goal of promoting more homeownership and better housing for
as many of the poor as possible.
In making this argument, however, the government ignores the
119. 12 U.S.C. § 1715l(d)(2) (1970), incorporated into § 235 by 12 U.S.C. § 1715z(i)(2)
(1970).
120. See, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29, 44-48 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
121. See, e.g., id. at 44-45, a!f'd, 490 F.2d at 1367-68. See also Defendants' Answers to
Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Raymond Carrasco at 2, Nash v.
Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973): "There is no statutory obliga-
tion on the part of HUD to inspect homes for compliance with local codes. Such an
inspection would not be feasible because of the magnitude of work involved and the
great variety of code provisions that exist within the thousands of cities and counties in
the nation in which Sections 221(d)(2) and 235 insured housing is located." See also Ap-
pellees' Brief on Appeal at 28-29, Perry v. Romney, Civil No. 9347 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5,
1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 472 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1973):
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development has promulgated an exhaustive
set of uniform minimum standards of habitability with which all Federal Housing
Administration appraisers are commanded to comply. These standards are sometimes
above and sometimes below local codes .... It would be unreasonable, if not impos-
sible, for FHA appraisers to become knowledgeable about the codes of every county
and town in which they make appraisals. Such an order would certainly diminish
the effectiveness of the Housing Act and thereby thwart the intent of Congress.
(Emphasis added.)
122. HUD made this argument in Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
even though, to the court's confusion, HUD did not cite § 221(f) as such.
123. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(f) (1970).
124. See sources cited in note 121 supra.
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fact that the statute does not make meeting the Secretary's standards
an alternative to code compliance. Instead, §§ 221(d)(2) and 23512-
require'2 not only that the properties meet the Secretary's standards
but also that the properties meet "the requirements of all State laws,
or local ordinances and regulations, relating to the public health or
safety, zoning, or otherwise, which may be applicable thereto ... 
The courts thus far have rejected the government's statutory con-
struction of the code-compliance provisions.
1 27
The government has also argued that the courts lack jurisdiction
over these plaintiffs' claims under the Tucker Act and that the plain-
tiffs have no claim upon which relief may be granted under the
Tucker Act, because (a) the code-compliance requirement does not
give rise to any right or claim in the plaintiffs, 1 28 and (b) the Tucker
Act covers only claims for money that the government has wrongfully
received and retained or that the government is required under ex-
plicit statutory language to pay over to the plaintiffs. 129 So far these
contentions have carried the day for the government. 30
As to the first contention, the code-compliance provision was en-
acted as part of the Housing Act of 1959,131 and the legislative history
of that Act is silent on whether or not the provision was intended
125. See note 119 supra.
126. "To be eligible for insurance under this section, a mortgage shall be secured by
property upon which there is located a dwelling conforming to the applicable standards
prescribed by the Secretary under [§ 221(f)], and meeting the requirements of all State
laws, or local ordinances and regulations, relating to the public health or safety, zoning,
or otherwise, which may be applicable thereto . (Emphasis added.)
127. The district court's response in Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29, 44 (E.D. Pa.
1973), afJ'd on this issue, 490 F.2d 1360, 1367-68 (3d Cir. 1974), was that
Congress in its wisdom has mandated that defendants follow certain procedures in
carrying out the 221(d)(2) and 235 Existing House Programs. If the defendants feel that
they are unworkable it is incumbent upon them to go to Congress for a change in
the law.... If more money is needed to finance these programs they should appeal
to the conscience of the government and the nation.
(Note, however, that because the district court had failed to determine under FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c) that the suit was a class action or to define the class, the injunction granted
by the district court is vacated and the case remanded for a narrower injunction. 490
F.2d at 1366, 1370. Presumably it should be no problem to get such class relief if the
proper technicalities are followed, given the rest of the Third Circuit's opinion on this
issue.)
128. See Appellees' Brief on Appeal at 19, 25, Perry v. Romney, Civil No. 9347 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 5, 1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 472 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1973): "[T]he
National Housing Act does not create a duty running to the Purchasers."
129. See, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1371 (3d Cir. 1974).
130. Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29, 46-48 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (dismissing the Tucker
Act claim on ground (b)), aff'd on ground (a), 490 F.2d 1360, 1371-72 (3d Cir. 1974);
Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK, at 10-11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973) (quoting the
Davis district court with approval); Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737, 739-41 (D.D.C.
1973), afjd sub nom. Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No. 73-1510, at 4-7 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974).
131. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, 73 Stat. 654. The code-compliance
provision was § 110(b), 73 Stat. 659.
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to create rights in, or to protect, the home buyers under these pro-
grams. 132 The government has argued' 33 that the only purpose of
the requirement was to protect the government in the event that a
mortgagor under these programs defaulted and the government had
to pay off the insured mortgage and then try to recoup its expenses
by selling the foreclosed house. The government can also point out
that even under § 203, the original FHA mortgage insurance pro-
gram (for middle-income and upper-income purchasers), 34 the gov-
ernment has long been required 135 to appraise the houses before
insuring a mortgage and to communicate this appraised value to
the home buyers, and yet the Supreme Court in United States v.
Neustadt 36 held that "there is no legal relationship between the
FHA and the individual mortgagor."'
37
The legislative history of § 203 should not, however, be applied
automatically to §§ 235 and 221(d)(2). Although the 1959 legislative
history is silent, there is plenty of prior and subsequent legislative
history from which such an intent can be discerned. 38 Much of this
derives from Congress' consideration of the Housing Act of 1958,
where the code-compliance requirement was first proposed. That Act
failed to pass before the session ended, but its new code-compliance
requirement was adopted as part of the 1959 Act.' 39 There are solid
grounds for arguing that the code-compliance requirement, which
had not been enacted when the Neustadts bought their house,
40
is different in kind from the appraisal requirement, and that the his-
tory and intent behind §§ 235 and 221(d)(2) are different from those
132. S. REp. No. 924, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1959), says merely that § 110(b) "Ealmends
section 221(d) to increase the maximum mortgage amount for a single-family residence
from $10,000 to $12,000 in high-cost areas. Makes eligible for mortgage insurance 2-, 3-,
and 4-family dwellings which meet FHA minimum property standards and appropriate
State and local housing ordinances or regulations." Apparently this is the only congres-
sional report dealing with § 110(b) of the 1959 Act: Jackson v. Romney. 355 F. Supp. 737,
743 n.14 (D.D.C. 1973), afj'd sub nom. Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No. 73-1510 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
17, 1974).
133. See, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1372 (3d Cir. 1974).
134. Originally enacted as Act of June 27, 1934, ch. 847, § 203, 48 Stat. 1248.
135. Under § 226; 12 U.S.C. § 1715q (1970), originally enacted as Act of Aug. 2, 1954,
ch. 649, § 126, 68 Stat. 607.
136. 366 U.S. 696 (1961). This case is more fully analyzed at p. 316 infra.
137. 366 U.S. at 709, quoting as dispositive H.R. REP. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
66-67 (1954) (conference report). But see note 202 infra.
138. See the analysis of the 1958 legislative history in Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 33-35
n.114. For prior and subsequent legislative history of §§ 221(d)(2) and 235, see sources
cited in note 141 infra. The history found unconvincing in Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No.
73-1510, at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974) is only a small part of that available.
139. See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 33-35 n.114.
140. The Neustadts had bought their house under § 203 in 1957. The code-compliance
requirement was first enacted in 1959 and apparently has never applied to § 203 houses.
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behind § 203.141 Under traditional rules of statutory construction, 42
a statutory provision is not to be read as being merely repetitive and
superfluous if it can be read in another way, and the code-com-
pliance requirement is superfluous if protecting FHA financially is
its only goal. Even if a house is sub-code, FHA will not be hurt
financially at all if the appraised price accurately reflects the sub-
standard condition of the house and the cost of repairs needed to
bring it up to code, adjusted, perhaps, for the degree of code en-
forcement customary in the locale involved.
143
On this basis it can be argued that there is indeed a legal rela-
tionship between the FHA and at least those individuals who became
mortgagors under § 235 or § 221(d)(2), even if not those under § 203.144
However, there remains the problem of just how far the Tucker Act
reaches here. At least two courts1 4 5 have dismissed Tucker "Act of
Congress" complaints by low-income homeowner plaintiffs on the
basis of Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States.'46 Eastport con-
cluded that the only noncontractual claims cognizable under the
Tucker Act are those where the United States has improperly exacted
141. See Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor, supra note 2, at 526-29; Plaintiffs' Brief
at 11-18, Massey v. Lynn, Civil No. 39822 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 1974), appeal docketed,
Civil No. 74-2122, 6th Cir., Oct. 14, 1974; Brief for Appellants at 18-23, Jackson v. Rom-
ney, 355 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub noma. Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No. 73-1510
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974) (renumbered from Civil No. 775-72); Le Clercq, supra note 9, at
44 n.151.
142. See 73 Aht. JuR. 2o Statutes § 250, at 423-24 (1974); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 326, at
630-31 (1953).
143. A related argument is that:
It is of great moment that 12 U.S.C. § 1715l(d)(2) requires conformity of properties
to both the standards prescribed by the Secretary and to the requirements of all
State laws or local ordinances, or regulations relating to the public health, or safety,
zoning, or otherwise .... As the FHA Minimum Property Standards Manual acknowl-
edges, '...building code[s] ... are primarily concerned with factors of health and
safety and not the many other aspects of design and use which are included herein
as essential for mortgage insurance determinations.' Had Congress been concerned
only with the security of FHA insured mortgages, as is the case in the § 203 Neustadt
situations, the Minimum Property Standards would be sufficient to satisfy Con-
gressional policy.
Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 77-78.
144. See pp. 320-22 infra.
145. These are: (1) Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29, 46-48 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd on
other grounds, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974) (It is true that the Third Circuit explicitly
"reject[s] any statement... contained in Eastport ... on which the court below relied
[in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction]," 490 F.2d at 1371, but it "do[es] not pass on the
scope of the Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity .... ." Id. at 1372. The same
Eastport type of reasoning might well have led the Third Circuit to find jurisdiction but
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.); (2) Nash v.
Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK, at 11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973) (which quotes the lower
Davis court with approval on precisely this point, although it does not actually cite
Eastport directly). See Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737, 739-41 (D.D.C. 1973), af'd
sub nom. Jackson v. Lynn, Civil No. 73-1510 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1974) (uses somewhat
similar reasoning, even if not explicitly citing Eastport).
146. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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or retained money from the plaintiff, or where the relevant statute,
regulation, or constitutional provision "command[s], in itself and
as correctly interpreted," payment of money to the plaintiff.147
Although Eastport analyzes several cases in reaching its conclusion,
it does not cite any cases specifically voicing its precise interpretation
of the Tucker Act's limits. 148 Nevertheless, there are some cases which
may be viewed as logical precursors of the Eastport rule.140 Moreover,
although it certainly seems possible to read the Tucker Act less re-
strictively, research discloses no case in which a nonmonetary right
created by statute has been held sufficient to give rise to Tucker
Act relief.150 There are numerous cases'5' in which courts have rem-
edied the deprivation of nonmonetary federal rights by ordering
damages-but in none of those cases has the United States or one of
147. Id. at 1007-08 (emphasis added).
148. See 372 F.2d at 1008-10. Indeed, the United States as defendant hardly pushed
this point, discussing it only in passing (with no case citations) on two pages of its 70-
page brief. Certainly the construction of the Tucker Act in Eastport, while plausible, is
not necessary.
149. In Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922), the Supreme Court
said that "liability for.., the consequences of a law, on the part of the legislating power,
is most unusual, and where ... the liability would mount to great sums, only the plainest
language could warrant a Court in taking it to be imposed." In Creek Nation v. United
States, 318 U.S. 629 (1943) the Court held that "[a] promise by the government to try to
keep the peace is not equivalent to a promise to make payments if the peace is not
kept . Id. at 634. It is noteworthy that in Creek Nation, the treaty provided that "the
United States guarantees [to the Creeks] quiet possession of their country...," see id. at
633, and that the jurisdictional statute (Act of May 24, 1924, ch. 181, 43 Stat. 139 (noted
at 318 U.S. at 630 n.1)) was more broadly worded than is the Tucker Act, in that it
covered "any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing out of any
treaty or agreement between the United States and the Creek Indian Nation ...." (Em-
phasis added.) (Note that this emphasized language was not stressed by the plaintiffs in
their briefs, and that the Court quotes the Act merely as giving jurisdiction "over claims
under 'any treaty or agreement between the United States' and these tribes." 318 U.S. at
630.) Similar holdings appear in Leighton v. United States, 161 U.S. 291, 296-97 (1896),
and in Roden Coal Co. v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 219, 231 (1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
636 (1942).
150. The Davis district court despite "extensive research" also was unable to find a
single case "which support[s] or even suggest[s] that an implied cause of action [for
monetary damages] can find its jurisdictional basis in the Tucker Act." 355 F. Supp. at 48.
151. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33 (1916). Numerous cases contain language to the effect that implied money damages
are awardable under the Tucker Act as compensation for statutorily granted rights. See,
e.g., United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390 (1906); Chambers v. United States, 451
F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Fletcher v.
United States, 392 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Watson v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 755 (Ct.
Cl. 1958); Stringer v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 375 (Ct. Cl. 1950). The problem with
these cases is that they all involve statutes granting the right to money (here, to back pay).
This is also true in the following cases having such language about implied money
damages: Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1972) (inverse condem-
nation compensation-see note 113 supra); Mayor & Council v. United States, 162 F. Supp.
243 (D. Del. 1957) (payments due to a city from a federally assisted public housing
authority); Betts v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 450 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (military disability
compensation). Thus the language referred to in these decisions can be viewed purely as
dicta, and the decisions as not inconsistent with Eastport.
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its agencies been the defendant. There are, on the other hand, a
great many cases'5 2 which hold that the Tucker Act, as a relinquish-
ment of sovereign immunity, must be strictly interpreted.1 3 Finally,
it should be noted that "[t]he settled doctrine is that only Congress
can waive immunity from suit.' 1 5 4 It is not illogical to view the
enactment of § 518(b) 15 as an expression of opinion by Congress
that it had not otherwise waived sovereign immunity with respect
to this type of claim by low-income homeownership plaintiffs.1 6
The Tucker Act "Act of Congress" jurisdiction also does not apply




explicitly provides that the HUD Secretary's "decisions regarding
expenditures or payments [under § 518(b)], and the terms and con-
ditions under which the same are approved or disapproved, shall be
final and conclusive and shall not be subject to judicial review."
It is well established that where the United States "creates rights
in individuals against itself, [it] is under no obligation to provide
a remedy through the courts,"" and "where a statute creates a right
and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive."'
C. Contract Claims
There have also been at least two cases' 60 brought on the theory
that the plaintiffs have a claim founded upon contracts with the
United States. The plaintiffs allege express and implied contracts,
and also third party beneficiary theory:
152. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941).
153. There are some cases calling for liberal construction-e.g., United States v. Emery,
Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28 (1915)-but these cases seem to be in the minority.
154. Developments, supra note 113, at 878 n.838.
155. See p. 303 supra.
156. See Nash v. Romney, Civil No. 72-1313-RJK, at 5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1973). Of
course, this is not a necessary construction, either. Consider Le Clercq, supra note 9, at
44 n.151: "If there were questions about Congressional intent with regard to the rights of
low income housing consumers subsidized under § 235, it was removed by legislative
history of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 .... 'All too often, the FHA
has viewed its role as a neutral middleman in a business transaction. As a government
agency the FHA has an obligation to ensure that purchasers of section 235 homes are not
misled into paying an exorbitant price or purchasing a seriously defective dwelling on
the basis of the FHA appraised price and approval of subsidy payments.' S. REP. No. 1216,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1970)."
157. See note 82 supra.
158. United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919). See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 573 (1962).
159. Id.
160. Cason v. United States, Civil No. 19025-2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 5, 1973) (partial sum-
mary judgment denying damage claim), (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1974) (dismissing other claims),
appeal docketed, Civil No. 74-1672, 8th Cir., Aug. 23, 1974; Massey v. Lynn, Civil No.
39822 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 74-2122, 6th Cir., Oct. 14,
1974.
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The mortgagor as part of his monthly payment pays an FHA
insuring premium. Surely the exchange of consideration between
the mortgagor-purchaser and the FHA establishes an expressed
[sic] contract as well as an implied contract which falls within the
purview of the Tucker Act. Furthermore, the mortgagor-pur-
chaser is certainly a third-party beneficiary to any agreement
which is executed between the mortgagee and FHA. 161
It is hard to credit these contract contentions. It is the mortgagee.
not the mortgagor-buyer, who directly pays the premium to the
FHA.'62 This is logical, since the premium is the consideration paid
to FHA for FHA's doing the service for the mortgagee of insuring
the mortgage that the mortgagee holds. It is true that the mortgagee
does not have to absorb the cost of the premium himself; the law
allows him to pass the cost on to the mortgagor.1 3 But this arrange-
ment is different from one in which the mortgagor directly pays a
fee to the FHA in return for the FHA's warranting or guaranteeing
the house that the mortgagor is to receive. The significance of the
(indirect) premium payments was not directly argued in Neustadt,
but it seems a weak basis on which to attack the holding there that
"there is no legal relationship between the FHA and the individual
mortgagor."'
6 4
Unfortunately, plaintiffs' third party beneficiary argument is also
flawed. The FHA does not covenant with the mortgagee that the FHA
will inspect or appraise the house (and certainly not that it will in-
spect or appraise the house in a non-negligent manner). Indeed, the
fact that the loan is insured makes the mortgagee quite unconcerned
about getting a promise from FHA that it will not overappraise the
home or approve a sub-code home.16 5 If anyone has breached a promise
meant for the benefit of the home buyer in a contract between the
United States and the mortgagee, it is the mortgagee in situations
where the FHA has simply noted a significant defect and left it solely
to the mortgagee to provide certification that the defect was removed
or corrected.' 66 Thus, if the plaintiffs are to sue anyone as third party
161. Plaintiffs' Suggestions on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 15, Cason v. United
States, Civil No. 19025-2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 5, 1973) (partial summary judgment denying
damage claim), (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1974) (dismissing other claims), appeal docketed, Civil
No. 74-1672, 8th Cir., Aug. 23, 1974. See also Plaintiffs' Brief at 44-53, Massey v. Lynn,
Civil No. 39822 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, Civil No. 74-2122, 6th Cir.,
Oct. 14, 1974.
162. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1709(b)(6), 1709(c) (1970).
163. Id. § 17151(d)(2).
164. See note 137 supra.
165. See pp. 296-97 & note 30 supra.
166. Thus, the Brief for Appellants at 7-8, Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir.
1974), alleged that the HUD Philadelphia office often insured mortgages on houses in
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beneficiaries, the one to be sued is the mortgagee, not the United
States. Third party beneficiary theory might in some respects provide
an easier route toward recovery against the mortgagee than does
fraud,167 but it does not advance plaintiffs any further as against
the United States. 68
VI. Suing the United States for Damages under the
Federal Tort Claims Act
The major remaining waiver of federal sovereign immunity 69 is
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).170 Subject to specified excep-
tions,17' it allows the United States to be sued
for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred. 7 2
Several suits have been brought by low-income homeownership
participants under the FTCA,173 but several plaintiffs' attorneys, out
of fear of the Neustadt case,' 74 have chosen to emphasize instead one
which the HUD appraisers had spotted "obvious and serious defects," and in which HUD
had no information leading it to believe that those defects had been repaired except
"certifications from non-existent companies and from persons having an interest in the
property, mortgagee, broker or seller." For some corroboration of this, see STAFF REPORT,
supra note 35, at 28, 37.
167. See Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1968); Morrocco v. Felton, 112 N.J. Super. 226, 270 A.2d 739 (1970). See also
pp. 300-01 supra.
168. In connection with this "contract" section of the Tucker Act, note that at most
there might be a contract implied in law here, and it has repeatedly been held that the
Tucker Act does not cover contracts implied in law, although it may cover contracts im-
plied in fact. See, e.g., Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1925); Stewart Sand
& Material Co. v. Southeast State Bank, 318 F. Supp. 870, 874 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
169. Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REV. 383, 385, 403 (1970). (The
Court of Claims Act of 1855, Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, is the basis of
current 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970) and is the precursor of the Tucker Act.)
170. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674-80 (1970).
171. Id. § 2680.
172. Id. § 1346(b).
173. Perry v. Romney, Civil No. 9347 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 1971), appeal dismissed as
moot, 472 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1973); Cason v. United States, Civil No. 19025-2 (W.D. Mo.
Apr. 5, 1973) (partial summary judgment denying damage claim), (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1974)
(dismissing other claims), appeal docketed, No. 74-1672, 8th Cir., Aug. 23, 1974; Williams
v. United States, Civil No. KC-3346 (D. Kan., filed June 8, 1971); Brown v. United States,
Civil No. 18943-2 (W.D. Mo., filed Dec. 23, 1970), dismissed without prejudice (Apr. 1,
1971).
174. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
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or more of the APA and Tucker Act bases for suit discussed above. 17
Neustadt held" 0 that FTCA recovery was barred to a § 20317 home
buyer who had relied on an excessive FHA appraisal, 178 because of
the section 179 of the FTCA which exempts the United States from
liability for "any claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation [or]
deceit . . . ." The Court added'80 that no other tort was present on
which the Neustadts could recover since there was "no legal relation-
ship between the FHA and the individual [§ 203] mortgagor."''
There are solid grounds on which Neustadt can be distinguished,
even though one cannot be certain that the courts will use them.
The Neustadts specifically alleged'8 2 that they had relied upon the
FHA appraisal statement to disclose any substantial deficiency or
defect in the property. In contrast, many of the low-income home-
ownership plaintiffs were never told anything about the value or
condition of the property by anyone from FHA, 83 and many could
not have read any forms that they might have been given which
might have shown the appraised value or purported to make a state-
ment about code-compliance. 8 4 To the extent they relied on gov-
ernment action at all, they "relied" on the government in a more
subtle sense. Unscrupulous or careless realtors and sellers apparently
had a strong selling point when they represented that the sale was
under a government program, and thus that the buyer had no reason
to be concerned about deficient housing.
8 5
175. Telephone Interview with Thomas C. Carey, Esq., Legal Aid attorney for Massey
(of Massey v. Lynn, Civil No. 39822 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-
2122, 6th Cir., Oct. 14, 1974), March 1, 1974. Several other attorneys have expressed
similar sentiments. See also Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor, supra note 2, at 566;
Abuses, supra note 2, at 479-80.
176. 366 U.S. at 711.
177. See note 20 supra; 366 U.S. at 697 n.2.
178. FHA appraised the property at $22,750 for mortgage insurance purposes; Neu-
stadt paid $24,000 for the house; and its value, because of poor soil conditions, was later
found to have been no more than $16,000. 366 U.S. at 699-701.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
180. 366 U.S. at 706-11.
181. See note 137 supra.
182. Record at 1.
183. See Special Project, supra note 28, at 132: "Less than seventeen percent (17%) of
the homeowners interviewed had ever talked to or had any correspondence with any
government official." See also, as to the § 226 requirement (p. 310 supra), Plaintiffs'
Suggestions on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 4, Cason v. United States, Civil No.
19025-2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 5, 1973) (partial summary judgment denying damage claim),
(W.D. Mo. July 8, 1974) (dismissing other claims), appeal docketed, No. 74-1672, 8th Cir.,
Aug. 23, 1974: "Section 226 of the National Housing Act of 1954 which requires the dis-
closure to the buyer prior to sale, of the FHA appraisal, which was considered to be an
important fact of the basis of the plaintiff's [sic] case in Neustadt, is in fact rarely com-
plied with by mortgagees in Kansas City, Missouri."
184. See, e.g., Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor, note 2 supra at 525.
185. See, e.g., Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor, note 2 supra, at 525, 537-38. Thus,
these low-income homeownership participants may have reasonably relied on govern-
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Even if some element of government misrepresentation were present
in some cases, moreover, the Court in Neustadt indicated that the mere
presence of such an element does not in itself completely disqualify
a plaintiff from any recovery under the FTCA if some different,
independent tort is present:
[A] Torts Act claim for property damages suffered when a vessel
ran aground as a result of the Coast Guard's allegedly negligent
failure to maintain the beacon lamp in a lighthouse . . .does not"arise out of... misrepresentation," any more than does one based
upon a motor vehicle operator's negligence in giving a misleading
turn signal. As Dean Prosser has observed, many familiar forms of
negligent conduct may be said to involve an element of "misrep-
resentation," in the generic sense of the word .... 186
There is thus a crucial distinction between negligent misrepresenta-
tion and negligence which simply involves an element of communica-
tion. The Court's care in pointing out this distinction has been
followed in several later lower court decisions.' 87
ment protection and yet not have been subject to misrepresentation by the government
(unless one considers the enactment of a statute which induces reasonable expectations of,
and reliance on, government protection which does not in fact materialize as constituting
misrepresentation-an unlikely holding under local tort law, which governs under the
FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970)).
186. 366 U.S. at 711 n.26. The passage from Neustadt quoted in the text continues,
"but '[s]o far as misrepresentation has been treated as giving rise in and of itself to a
distinct cause of action in tort, it has been identified with the common law action of
deceit,' and has been confined 'very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or
commercial character in the course of business dealings.' Prosser, Torts, § 85 ...." Does
the Court mean that there may be § 2680(h) misrepresentation (and hence no recovery)
when certain acts cause pecuniary harm in business dealings, but that there is not §
2680(h) misrepresentation when identical acts wind up causing physical harm? Such a
differentiation seems illogical. But see Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-Governmental
Liability for Negligent Chart Publication & Aircraft Certification, 19 WAYNE L. REv.
1201, 1218 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Chart Publication]: "A limitation on the use of
the misrepresentation exception seems to be emerging... There appears to be a basic
distinction between cases based on government acts resulting in death and injury, and
cases causing monetary loss from business transactions." See also Note, The Federal Seal
of Approval: Government Liability for Negligent Inspection, 62 GEo. L.J. 937, 947, 958
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Federal Seal].
187. See Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 844 (1967): "The government's reading of the misrepresentation exception is
much too broad, for it would exempt from tort liability any operational malfunction by
the government that involved communication in any form .... Where the gravamen of
the complaint is the negligent performance of operational tasks, rather than misrepresen-
tation, the government may not rely upon § 2680(h) to absolve itself of liability." See also
Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1962): "Where the government,
on the basis of facts which it is chargeable with ascertaining by a proper examination,
has a duty to perform in addition to the duty of disclosing those facts, negligence in the
conduct of such examination which results in a failure to perform the additional duty
is not covered by the § 2680(h) exception." See also Beech v. United States, 345 F.2d 872,
874 (5th Cir. 1965): "Here, the Government had not only the duty to communicate to
Mrs. Beech a diagnosis of her condition, but also to render proper care for her treat-
ment. Under the allegations of the complaint there was a failure to perform this latter
duty and such failure is not covered by the 2680(h) exception." See also United Air Lines,
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The next question, then, is whether some other tort was present in
the current cases. Several other possible torts do exist: for example,
the negligent inspection in itself,188 negligence (perhaps negligence
per se' 80) in unlawfully0 0 approving mortgage insurance on a sub-
code house, 191 breach of a duty to rescue the plaintiffs from a peril
Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Federal
Seal, note 186 supra, at 946-47, 958. But see Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Exceptions to
the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 27 JAG J. 283, 289 & n.33 (1973). Other courts have
held that where two torts are present, the fact that relief for one is barred by an FTCA
exception does not preclude relief for the other. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269,
1275-76, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1974); Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968).
188. Of course, there would have to have been a duty on FHA's part to protect the
plaintiff, and the negligent inspection would have to have been the proximate cause of
the harm that resulted to the plaintiff. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs
§ 30 (4th ed. 1971), which identifies the following as "[t]he traditional formula for the
elements necessary to ... a cause of action [founded upon negligence, from which
liability will follow:] ... I. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the
actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against un-
reasonable risks. 2. A failure on his part to conform to the standard required .... 3. A
reasonable [sic] close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury...
[i.e.,] 'proximate cause.' 4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another."
(Footnotes omitted.) As to whether the government had a duty as to the home buyers
to inspect non-negligently, see pp. 320-22 infra. On the question whether the negligent
inspection was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' harm, consider that if a proper in-
spection had been made-disclosing the lack of code compliance-the mortgage insurance
could not have been issued and as a result the plaintiffs could not possibly have bought
the houses with all the defects complained about. See also note 191 infra.
For an example of a case where the United States was held liable (under the Suits in
Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1970); the FTCA was not mentioned in the opinion)
for negligence which included in part a negligent inspection, see Rapp v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967) [vacated upon stipulation of settlement, Civil
No. 16,847 (3d Cir. 1970) according to Chart Publication, supra note 186, at 1211 n.71].
There, 264 F. Supp. at 680-81, the court found that "[t]he government was negligent...
in failing to provide for further tests in determining the outcome when the Electra
[airplane] would meet a flight of birds and ingest them on take-off." But see Marival,
Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
189. See Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67, 70-74 (D. Minn.
1963) (negligence per se where Navy planes flew below the minimum altitude fixed by
federal regulation having the force of statute). Wildwood seems to be the only case where
violation of a federal statute (or regulation having force of statute) has been held to be
negligence per se. But cf. Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th
Cir. 1951).
190. See pp. 307-09 supra.
191. Note that such an argument (i.e., that approving the mortgage insurance negli-
gently was a tort separate from the negligent appraisal/misrepresentation tort) was put
forth by the Neustadts on appeal to the Supreme Court (although they had not raised
this argument before, and although no unlawfulness in approving the insurance was
alleged). The Neustadts' purchase contract for the house had been conditional upon
their getting a loan secured by an FHA-insured mortgage (at its lower-than-conventional-
mortgage-rates), so that "[i]t was the availability of this insurance and not the receipt of
the appraisal report that caused them to purchase the defective house. Had that mortgage
insurance not been issued the [Neustadts] could not and would not have purchased the
house." (Respondents' Brief at 26-27.) The Court never directly made reference to this
argument, and Neustadt certainly cannot be considered conclusively to reject it, partic-
ularly in light of the Court's care, 366 U.S. at 711 n.26, in reaffirming the continued
effectiveness of Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See pp. 310-11
supra and pp. 320-22 infra, on the question of whether such a relationship and duty
toward the low-income home buyer current plaintiffs should be found to exist.
As to proximate cause, clearly the approval of the mortgage insurance (and/or the
granting of the subsidy under § 235 to the home buyer: see p. 295 supra) was a cause
in fact of the plaintiffs' injury: The low-income homeownership programs are aimed
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into which the United States contributed in placing the plaintiffs, 192
and breach of a duty to warn. 1 3
These torts face two possible additional obstacles. First, the FTCA
has, in addition to the exceptions for misrepresentation and deceit,
an exception for "the exercise or performance or the failure to ex-
ercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused."'194 Second, and interrelated, is the
"no legal relationship" holding in Neustadt.19 5 If that holding were
to apply to these low-income homeownership plaintiffs, it would
negate any government "duties," or "fiduciary relationship" to the
plaintiffs.
As previously discussed,'9 6 the terms of the code-compliance re-
quirement'9 7 are not themselves discretionary. It appears settled' 98
precisely at those who, but for the FHA insurance of their "too risky" (marketwise)
mortgages (and/or the § 235 subsidy), could not otherwise have bought the houses that
they bought under the programs. See p. 296 supra; note 28 supra; Le Clercq, supra note
9, at 7-11. But see note 24 supra. In addition, the harm that resulted could reasonably
have been foreseen by the government (particularly after the initial scandals-see p. 298
supra-and probably even before as well, since the major elements leading to the
scandals (pp. 296-97 supra) were clearly foreseeable). In regard to "reasonable fore-
sceability," note the rule that "if [an individual] has in fact knowledge, skill, or even
intelligence superior to that of the ordinary man, the law will demand of him conduct
consistent with it." PROSSER, supra note 188, at 161 (footnotes omitted). Note also the
rule that an individual "may ... be engaged in an activity, or stand in a relation to
others, which imposes upon him an obligation to investigate and find out, so that he
becomes liable not so much for being ignorant as for remaining ignorant ...." Id. at 160
(footnotes omitted).
192. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 321-24 (1965). The Restatement would
limit liability in this regard to "physical harm" or "bodily harm." This would not help
all of the current plaintiffs and would not be a complete remedy even for those whom
it would help, but note that it would help at least some of the current plaintiffs. See
pp. 298, 299 supra; W . PROSSER, supra note 188, § 56, at 340-43.
193. See Note, The Duty to Warn and the Urban Riot: The Jahnke Case, 58 IoWA,
L. REv. 447, 450-62 (1972). Such a duty could arise from the implication of a fiduciary
relationship or confidential relationship between the United States and the current
plaintiffs (see note 207 infra; 37 Am. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 149 (1968)) or from vol-
untary assumption of a duty to inspect and/or warn and/or protect which has engen-
dered reliance (see 35 Ass. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 84 (1967)), and note that the
Court in Neustadt specifically affirmed-366 U.S. at 711 n.26-the continuing vitality
of Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), discussed in note 199 infra. See
Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir. 1966); Fair v. United States, 234
F.2d 288, 293-94 (5th Cir. 1956).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
195. 366 U.S. at 709.
196. See pp. 308-09 supra.
197. See p. 308 supra.
198. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd per
curiam sub nora. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955). A government air
traffic controller failed to follow CAA-prescribed Standard Airport Traffic Control
Procedures, and thus contributed to a collision of two airplanes. The Procedures had
been promulgated under authority of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and had bind-
ing force, yet the United States argued that it was discretionary for the tower operators
as to whether to follow the procedures, since the tower operators' duties "involve the
exercise of discretion and judgment, with the result that neither the operators nor the
United States can be held liable for their negligent performance." Id. at 75. The court
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that an agency's decision to follow or to ignore such mandatory pro-
visions of a statute or binding regulation is not itself a discretionary
act within this FTCA exception. Moreover, even as to activities that
the government could have exercised discretion not to undertake, once
the government has elected to undertake them and has engendered
reliance on its performance of those activities, negligence in per-
formance is not within the "discretionary function" exception.'
The remaining key question, then, is whether in enacting the code-
compliance requirement, or in establishing the §§ 235 and 221(d)(2)
programs, the United States assumed any duties vis-h-vis the low-in-
come homeownership plaintiffs. 20 0 In Neustadt, which dealt with
§ 203's appraigal requirement, this question was answered in the nega-
tive.201 Perhaps Neustadt was ill-considered and ought to be over-
ruled,20 2 but in any event the present cases, which arise under §§ 235
and 221(d)(2), are distinguishable from Newstadt on the facts: In
addition to the general differences between the legislative history,
rejected this argument, holding that "the tower operators merely handle operational de-
tails which are outside the area of the discretionary functions and duties referred to in
§ 2680(a); and that, consequently, the Tort Claims Act permits the Government to be
sued for damages sustained because of their negligence." Id. See also Hatahley v. United
States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir.
1951).
199. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955). The Coast Guard had
allowed a lighthouse to get out of working order, resulting in plaintiff's tugboat going
aground, damaging the cargo that it was towing. The Court rejected the government's
attempt to get within the § 2680(a) "discretionary function" exception:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised
its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the
guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that
the light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished,
then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and
to repair the light or give warning that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard
failed in its duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is
liable under the Tort Claims Act.
In the same vein is Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288, 293-94 (5th Cir. 1956). The
United States here was held liable for damages for the deaths of three people shot by an
Air Force officer who had been released from an Air Force hospital where he had
threatened the life of one of those that he was to shoot. His doctors knew of the threats
and failed to keep their promise to give advance notification of his release to the person
that he had threatened so that precautions could be taken. The court rejected a § 2680(a)
challenge, holding that "if the Government undertakes to perform certain acts or func-
tions thus engendering reliance thereon, it must perform them with due care .... " Accord,
Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
200. The torts under discussion seem clearly to involve the other elements of negligence
discussed in note 188 supra.
201. See p. 310 supra.
202. Note, for example, the context from which the Court lifted the crucial "no legal
relationship" words (see p. 310 supra):
Historically, the fundamental soundness of ... the FHA home mortgage system has
rested on the integrity of its appraisal system .... [T]he FHA's appraisal system ... as
well as ... its inspection system ... are obviously essential to the proper underwriting
of mortgage loan risks, and therefore operate primarily for the protection of the
Government and its insurance funds. Nevertheless, Congress has consistently rec-
ognized-and intended-that, notwithstanding the fact that, technically there is no
320
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provisions, and operation of § 203, and of §§ 235 and 221(d)(2),
Neustadt differs from the present cases in the type of plaintiffs in-
volved, the type of harm suffered, the cause of the harms that oc-
curred, and the reasonableness of reliance that the plaintiffs may have
engaged in. Unlike these plaintiffs, Neustadt was an attorney20 3 and
so presumably was neither ill-educated, poor, nor incapable of owning
a home unless he could get mortgage insurance from the govern-
ment.20 4 In addition, Neustadt apparently was rather sophisticated as a
home buyer, admitting20 5 that he had "considered the possibility of
hiring someone to inspect the house in order to ascertain whether it
was structurally sound." 20 6 The low-income homeownership plaintiffs
are notably unsophisticated as to home buying20 7 and thus bargain with
legal relationship between the FHA and the individual mortgagor, these FHA pro-
cedures also operate for the benefit and protection of the individual home buyer.
However, there has apparently been a strong tendency on the part of the FHA to
view these procedures as operating exclusively for the protection of the Government
and its insurance funds. The Committee of Conference does not believe such a view
to be consistent with the intent of the Congress in respect of the basic legislation
relating to the FHA in the past, and, as to the future, desire to make it abundantly
clear that such is not the case.
In this connection, the committee of conference calls attention to... the provision
[in the conference substitute bill] which requires that the seller or builder... shall
agree to deliver, prior to the execution of a contract for the sale of the property,
to the purchaser a written statement setting forth the amount of the FHA's ap-
praised value of the property.
The committee of conference desires to point out the importance it attaches to...
[that] provision.
H.R. REP. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1954) (conference report). And the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency had taken the position that
the first responsibility of Congress, and that of any agency administering part or all
of the housing program, is to protect and preserve the public interest, in general,
and the rights of homeowners in particular. It is your committee's considered opinion
... that the HHFA and its constituent agencies ... shall at all times regard as a
primary responsibility their duty to act in the interest of the individual home pur-
chaser and in so doing to protect his interest to the extent feasible.
S. REP. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1954).
203. Record at 14, United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
204. See pp. 295, 296, 316 supra.
205. Record at 15, United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
206. He decided to rely on the FHA's appraisal, instead(!). Id.
207. See pp. 296, 316 supra. Indeed, these facts would all seem to permit the rela-
tionship between the FHA and the low-income home buyers to be treated as a fiduciary
relationship or confidential relationship (see note 192 supra) or as a quasi-guardian/ward
relationship (see Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 383 F.2d
991, 1000-01 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 900 (1967); Seneca Nation v. United States,
173 Ct. Cl. 917, 925-27 (1965)), which should seem to satisfy the duty requirement.
Finally, consider Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir. 1966), where the
United States was held liable for the killing by an airman of his wife when one govern-
ment doctor failed to furnish another with an adequate history of the airman's mental
illness, causing the airman to be returned to duty where he had access to weapons and
ammunition.
The United States argues that the Regulation and instructions were 'designed for
the protection of the United States against theft or loss of ordnance.' We do not
agree. The Regulation states that, 'Precautionary measures are needed to minimize
accidents.' One of the instructions having to do with 'Firearms and Ammunition'
expresses a purpose, 'To prevent serious injury to himself or to another person.' It
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the sellers on unequal terms. Neustadt's injury was purely a pecuniary
one; his house developed cracks due to a soil problem,208 lowering its
monetary value. The current plaintiffs have received houses that
have posed health problems, led to personal injuries, and often turned
out to be so dangerous as to be of negative value. Neustadt's harm
clearly was caused by his reliance on the negligent FHA appraisal.
FHA's action in Neustadt either was not a tort since reliance was
unreasonable or it was at most the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
The causes of the §§ 235 and 221(d)(2) plaintiffs' harm were acts that
fall outside of the misrepresentation exception to the FTCA.
Conclusion
That thousands of people have been victimized under the federal
low-income homeownership program has been long and widely noted,
and yet large numbers of these victims have been allowed to go
remediless. This Note has argued that although relief seems unavail-
able under the Tucker Act and incomplete at best under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, it should be obtainable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, notwithstanding Neustadt.2°9
Nevertheless, congressional action is called for. Since the experience
to date makes it obvious that widespread success in litigation is un-
likely in the near future,210 improvement of § 518 administrative
remedies is certainly desirable.2 11 More fundamentally, even eventual
relief under the FTCA for the low-income homeownership plaintiffs
will not overcome the major flaws in the FTCA statutory scheme re-
vealed starkly during this long history of attempts to recover for
damages inflicted because of a major administrative scandal. Thus,
Congress should consider carefully whether it is still necessary or
desirable for the United States to be held harmless for the deliberate
torts of its employees now excepted under the FTCA.2 12 Congress
stretches the credible to say that at least one reason for maintaining tight control
of firearms and ammunition was not the maintenance of safety. Clearly, we think,
the precautionary measures were intended to minimize accidents and to prevent in-
jury to persons; they were for the benefit of the public, including Mrs. Dunn.
It would not tax the imagination to apply these words to the cases under discussion in
this Note.
208. 366 U.S. at 700.
209. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
210. See note 4 supra.
211. On the defects of § 518, see pp. 305-06 supra.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970). [T]he principal hole that unnecessarily remains in the
Federal Tort Claims Act [is] the immunity from liability for specified deliberate torts.
For no good reason-for no reason whatsoever disclosed in the legislative history-
government liability was withheld for [the specified deliberate torts]. Illogical and un-
explained are such exceptions along with government liability for [other deliberate
torts]." Davis, supra note 169, at 386.
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should also consider whether recovery under the FTCA should re-
main dependent on the vicissitudes of local tort law, 213 particularly
as to acts committed on a national scale by the federal government.
Finally, because of the unconscionable delay in remedying the "home-
ownership for the poor" fiasco and because of the unique position and
resources of the federal government, Congress might even use this
occasion to consider whether the traditional tort requirement of duty
or obligation on the part of the purported tortfeasor should continue
to apply to the United States as defendant, particularly with respect
to the least educated and most impoverished among the populace. Per-
haps it is time for the United States to accept greater Good Sa-
maritan affirmative duties than are borne by its individual citizens.
214
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). "The states often differ with regard to what constitutes
tortious conduct, [so] it is not improbable that the Government may escape liability in
one state and yet be liable for the same type of conduct in another." L. JAYSON, HAN-
DLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDE S § 218.01, at 9-147
(1972).
214. See Federal Seal, supra note 186, at 959 n.168.
